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I. Introduction
This report summarizes the principal developments in calendar year 2000 relating to
treaties, international agreements, and judicial decisions affecting international intellectual
property rights. Highlighted below are the Patent Law Treaty; the Patent Cooperation
Treaty; the European Patent Convention; the European Union Copyright Directive; the
new EU Design Right; U.S. Accession to the Madrid Protocol; decisions by the World
Trade Organization, European Court of Justice, and the European Patent Court; develop-
ments at the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN); and recent
U.S. court decisions relating to jurisdiction in cyberspace and Internet domain names.
II. Treaties and International Agreements
A. PATENT LAW TRFATY
In June 2000, forty-four countries, including the United States adopted the Patent Law
Treaty.' Developed by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Patent
Law Treaty represents more than fifteen years of international efforts to attain harmoni-
zation in the domestic patent laws of various countries. Those efforts were originally aimed
at the implementation of uniform substantive standards of patentability; but, when that
proved impossible, international discussions moved toward the attainment of harmony in
administrative and procedural aspects of the patent application and prosecution process in
various patent offices around the world.
The Patent Law Treaty provides uniform standards to simplify the filing and prosecution
of patent applications in Member States. The Treaty minimizes the requirements for ob-
taining a filing date; eliminates many procedural difficulties with translations, certifications,
and fee payments; ensures adequate time limits for responses to office actions; and intro-
duces other procedural benefits.
*Bruce A. McDonald is a Partner with the Washington, D.C. law firm of Wiley, Rein & Fielding.
1. World Intellectual Property Organization Patent Law Treaty, Regulations Under Patent Law Treaty,
and Agreed Statements by Diplomatic Conference, June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047 [hereinafter Patent Law
Treaty].
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A key provision of the Patent Law Treaty guarantees the ability to restore the benefit of
priority if the application was filed within two months after the expiration of the priority
year and such failure to meet the priority date occurred in spite of all due care required by
the circumstances having been taken or, at the option of the contracting party, was unin-
tentional.
One issue that received widespread press coverage involved a protest by Colombia, joined
by most of the Latin American countries, who asserted the right to be compensated for use
of their natural resources, especially plants, and other "traditional knowledge" sources in-
corporated in biogenetic patents. These countries sought to include a provision in the
Patent Law Treaty requiring, as part of the patent application process, a statement that the
applicant obtained the original "starting material" with the originating country, where fail-
ure to obtain the proper consent would nullify the patent. The United States and other
developed countries made it clear that such a provision would kill any chance for adoption
of the Patent Law Treaty, and the Latin American countries ultimately waived their demand
in return for assurances that their concerns would receive further attention by WIPO and
other countries.
Developing countries also opposed the efforts of the United States to expedite acceptance
of electronic filing, especially for certain types of applications, such as "jumbo applications"
containing gene sequencing pages and other very large computer applications. These coun-
tries, represented principally by Egypt, opposed hastening the time of electronic filing
because of their lack of necessary technical resources. A compromise was reached under
which all communications on paper must be accepted for five years, after which any con-
tracting party may exclude acceptance of paper communication except for obtaining a filing
deed or meeting a deadline, provided that where the receiving or processing of a paper
communication is deemed impractical due to its character or size, a contracting party may
require the filing of that communication by other means of transmittal.
One of the major procedural issues at the diplomatic conference in Geneva involved the
degree to which applicants may file documents at the patent offices of the member states
without official representation. The United States, along with most U.S. bar associations
including the American Bar Association (ABA), pushed to give patent applicants the ability
to perform as many administrative tasks as possible without the need for official represen-
tation; whereas Europe and the European bar associations sought greater restrictions on
the ability of the applicant to perform tasks on its own. In compromise, the European
countries obtained a provision that requires the translation to be filed by an official rep-
resentative, but all other provisions in the original draft allowing actions to be taken without
an official representative were maintained, for example, provisions allowing the filing of an
application for purposes of obtaining priority, the mere payment of a fee, the filing of
priority documents, and the issuance of a receipt and notification with respect to any of
these items.
In addition, one restrictive provision was removed from the original Treaty draft in re-
spect to the ability of applicants to act without official representation. The original draft
contained a provision that would have required the registration in each country of a com-
puterized maintenance fee organization to make payments on behalf of applicants. In re-
sponse to lobbying by the ABA, the Treaty was modified to permit maintenance fee pay-
ments to be made by any person. As a result, commercial computer organizations will be
permitted to make annuity payments without any restrictions.
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B. PATENT COOPERATION TREATY
As efforts to adopt the Patent Law Treaty were culminating in Geneva, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) issued a proposal to reform the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT).2 Under the PTO's proposal, the reform would take place in two stages. In the first
stage, the PCT would be amended to simplify certain procedures and to conform the PCT
to the Patent Law Treaty. The second stage of reform would include a substantial overhaul
of the entire PCT system to take place over the long term.
During the first phase of the PCT reforms proposed by the PTO, measures would be
enacted to facilitate the filing and processing of patent applications, including:
(1) Eliminating the concept of designations;
(2) Eliminating all residency and nationality requirements;
(3) Conforming filing date requirements to those in the draft Patent Law Treaty;
(4) Conforming "missing part"-type requirements to draft PLT procedures;
(5) Availability of multiple searches and examinations;
(6) Eliminating the twenty-month deadline for entry into the national stage;
(7) Eliminating the concept of demands;
(8) Accommodating further deferral of national stage entry;
(9) Combining search and examination;
(10) Fee reassessment;
(11) Reducing/eliminating formalities, reviewing or handling applications;
(12) Reenergizing technical assistance under PCT Articles 51 and 56;
(13) Electronic international publication;
(14) Electronic transmission of search/examination results;
(15) Other Patent Law Treaty-consistent changes.
The second stage of reform would be more dramatic and would include:
(1) Regionalizing current search/examination authorities;
(2) Eliminating the distinction between national and international applications;
(3) Positive examination of results in certain PCT authorities binding contracting
states; and
(4) Providing further flexibility in terms of relaxed timing requirements for national
stage processing.
C. EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION
In the twelve months prior to April 2000, more than 126,000 European patent applica-
tions were filed at the European Patent Office (EPO), 10 percent more than the previous
year. The high volume has contributed to a backlog in patent searches. In response, the
BEST Project (Bringing Examination and Search Together), which combines search and
examination with one examiner, has been expanded with positive results.
Meanwhile, efforts to revise the European Patent Convention (EPC)3 are underway. On
October 19, 2000, the European Union launched formal consultations on whether the EPC
2. See Patent Cooperation Treaty, Jan. 24, 1978, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231, available at http:/I
www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/pk/index.htnl.
3. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 LL.M. 270.
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should be amended to explicitly allow the patenting of software. Article 52(2)(c) of the EPC
provides that "programs for computers ... shall not be regarded as inventions. '4 Yet thou-
sands of patents for technical inventions using a computer program have been granted by
patent offices of European states and by the EPO. The practice varies widely among Mem-
ber States. This debate commenced in 1997 when the European Commission put out its
Green Paper on the Community patent and the patent system in Europe.5 Commentators
believe that the exclusion of patentability for computer programs contained in Article
52(2)(c) of the EPC will be removed by the prospective revisions, bringing the EPC into
conformance with U.S. law.
In general, the need for patent harmonization is commonly recognized, with differences
of opinion involving the level at which the harmonization should take place. The EC's
Green Paper specifically addressed whether the Commission should adopt more liberal
conditions coming closer to the practice in the United States.6 The Green Paper tentatively
suggested that to have an "inventive step," the computer-related invention must make a
technical contribution that is not obvious. In a follow-up communication to the Green
Paper,7 one comment to the proposed language stated, "[a] computer-implemented inven-
tion which merely automates a known process using well known automation techniques
will, in principle, be obvious and therefore cannot, in principle, be considered to involve
an inventive step."' The consultation paper also specifically addressed the assessment of
technical and non-technical features of business method inventions. The EC proposed that
in determining technical contributions, only the technical features should be taken into
account. "Where the contribution lies merely in non-technical features, the invention will
not be considered as involving an inventive step,"9 the proposed language says.
Another principal issue in the EPO, related but not identical to the patenting of software,
concerns the patentability of business methods. Questions relating to the patentability of
software and business methods in Europe have gained considerable attention due to recent
changes in U.S. law.10 Generally, business methods are unpatentable in the EPO under
Article 52 of the European Patent Convention. However, in practice, it is believed that
most Internet-related applications describe technical means (e.g., computer networks) for
carrying out business methods and are thus not simply business methods as such. Of course,
such applications must satisfy the ordinary requirement that they overcome an objective
technical problem in a nonobvious way.
Among other proposals are amendments to streamline the EPC by transferring details
from the body of the Convention to the implementing regulations, which would increase
the flexibility of the EPC to accommodate ongoing international developments in patent
law and the growing number of Member States in the EPO.
4. See id. art. 52.
5. Green Paper on the Community patent and the patent system in Europe, COM(97)314 final, available
at http://europa.eu.intlcomm/internal-market/en/intprop/indprop/paten.pdf (last visited July 4, 2001) [here-
inafter Green Paper].
6. See id.
7. The Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions Consultation Paper by the Services of DG
Internal Market 19.10.2000 following Green Paper COM(97)314 and COM(99)42.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Bruce A. McDonald, Intellectual Property Rights and Electronic Commerce, American Bar Association,
Section of International Law and Practice (2000), available at http://www.wrf.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/
ip.ecommerce.pdf.
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Finally, there are proposals to reform the EPC in respect to litigation over European
patents. A working group under leadership of the French government is developing a pro-
posal for a European Patent Litigation Protocol (EPLO) involving the creation of a Eu-
ropean Patent Judiciary (EPJ), comprised of a common first instance court, a common
second instance court, and a registry. The EPJ would jointly deal with infringement and
validity of European patents, including sanctions and injunctive relief; its jurisdiction would
be exclusive.
D. EUROPEAN UNION COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE"
After three years in the pipeline, negotiations over the European Copyright Directive
continued in 2000, leading to formal adoption by the European Parliament on February
14, 2001. There are three key provisions: (1) a universal definition of non-commercial
private copying; (2) provisions to allow the use of temporary, "unauthorized" copies in the
process of distributing files on computer networks; and (3) criminal penalties for any at-
tempt to remove security measures from protected digital files. The majority of the pro-
visions are taken from the 1996 Copyright Treaty. Many Member States' existing copy-
right laws already meet or even exceed them in some areas, for example, the United
Kingdom, with its relatively strict regime.
The Copyright Directive is intended to ensure the existence of an internal market in
copyright and related rights, with particular emphasis on electronic commerce, and to create
a legislative framework capable of responding to new technological challenges. With the
Copyright Directive now in place, Europe now has an infrastructure with which to regulate
and harmonize its treatment of copyright in the so-called information society. In plainer
terms, it means that consumers will have to pay for content and face criminal penalties if
they are caught trying to evade or remove software security systems designed to stop them
from copying digital files.
Article Six of the Directive, outlawing "devices, products, components or services de-
signed to circumvent technological measures" that protect content, is likely to become the
most significant bit of the legislation in the next few years. It underlines the principle that
technology, rather than the courts, will play the most important role in safeguarding copy-
right, stimulating the nascent digital rights management industry in which companies such
as Intertrust and Reciprocal protect and collect royalties on digitally distributed content.
Meanwhile, content owners will have a new, universal right to pursue "crackers"-those
who attempt to beat the new software encryption systems.
The Copyright Directive is particularly helpful to the music industry and represents a
major victory for the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI). Con-
comitantly, the Directive is seen as a defeat for the telecommunications, broadcasting and
electronics industries, who argued unsuccessfully for a flexible interpretation of "private"
copying in the interest of reducing the need for expensive anti-copying technology and in
gaining the easiest possible access to music and video content to attract customers to new
online and mobile services.
11. Council Directive 01/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167/10).
12. Diplomatic Conference On Certain Copyright And Neighboring Rights Questions, Dec. 2-20, 1996.
13. Council Directive 97/0359/COD, 1999 COM 250.
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One controversial amendment, "Amendment 11," was proposed by broadcasters who
sought to preserve their access to "archives."' 4 This would have given broadcasters wide-
ranging rights to use material in their archives for "on-demand" services, subject to the
payment of "equitable remuneration, as appropriate" to authors and performers.5 However,
Amendment I 1 was rejected, and thus broadcasters will have to ask for permission if they
want to use archived material.
While the IFPI was successful in defeating many proposed amendments, it was disap-
pointed that the wording on private copying was not narrowed. The IFPI wanted to include
the wording "his/her private use" in the final document, but the words "his/her" were not
adopted, which left the phrasing somewhat ambiguous as to whether an individual has the
right to make a private copy for someone else. Telecommunications companies are also
relieved that they will not have to pay royalties on copies of digital files stored on networks
before onward distribution.
Another significant amendment that was adopted requires EU Member States to imple-
ment the directive into national law within eighteen months, rather than the original plan
of twenty-four months. That will help accelerate the European Union's commitment to
ratify two Internet-related WIPO treaties: a copyright treaty for authors, and a phonograms
and performances treaty for producers and performers.
The winners and losers in the process leading to adoption of the EU Copyright Directive
were evident immediately after the February 14, 2000, vote, when the IFPI's delegation
remained in the building to thank European Parliament members for their support, while
their counterparts on the other side of the issue, including representatives of the consumer-
electronics manufacturers, left stony-faced and refused to comment, according to reports.
Nevertheless, Internet service providers (ISPs) escaped further damage when the Parlia-
ment voted against an amendment imposing strict liability for carrying materials that in-
fringe copyright.16 The Parliament excluded an amendment that would have made ISPs
and application service providers (ASPs) liable for any information on their systems that
infringes copyright or allows someone to break copyright protection. ISPs already need to
monitor information on their system in the wake of a widely publicized defamation case
against Demon last year. However, ISPs are not liable for copyright infringement unless
they know that infringing material is on their system, and a copyright infringement case is
unlikely to succeed unless the ISP had clearly been warned to remove it.
The Copyright Directive is likely to be adopted by the Council of Ministers in the next
few weeks. Member States will then have eighteen months to incorporate it into national
law.
E. NEw DESIGN RIGHT IN EUROPEAN UNION
The European Parliament endorsed legislation creating a new design right that would
be directly applicable in all fifteen states of the European Union. Registration for a "Com-
munity Design" will be for five years from the date of application and renewable at five-
14. See Gordon Masson, EU Copyright Directive Embraced-European Parliament Decision Pleases Creative Com-
munity, BILLBOARD, Feb. 24, 2001.
15. Id.
16. See Aoife White, ISPs Not Liable For Copyrighted Content, NETWORx NEWS, Feb. 23, 2001, at http://
www.vnunet.com/News/1 118192.
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year intervals to a maximum of twenty-five years. The design right will be administered by
the EU Office for Harmonization of the Internal Markets in Alicante, Spain, which now
handles Community Trademarks.
F. U.S. AccEsSION TO THE MADRID PROTOCOL 17
The United States moved closer to ratification of the Madrid Protocol in 2000."8 The
principal obstacle to U.S. accession had been a dispute with the European Community over
voting rights of intergovernmental organizations. This dispute has been resolved. The
White House, in a May 31, 2000 press release issued during the United States/European
Union Summit, announced its support for the Madrid Protocol, and the U.S. State De-
partment is preparing the ratification documents for submission to the Senate. 19 The pres-
ident will have one year following Senate approval of the treaty to deposit the United States
instrument of ratification with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). This
delay is necessary to allow the PTO a sufficient opportunity to prepare and implement the
appropriate rules and procedures for operating under the Protocol. Thus, the United States
may become a member of the Madrid Protocol by year-end 2001.
1. One-Stop Application
U.S. adherence to the Protocol will have a substantial impact on the procedural aspects
of trademark practice. Principally, the Protocol establishes a "one-stop" international ap-
plication and registration system that, according to its supporters, will make it easier and
less expensive for American businesses to protect their trademarks as they expand in the
global marketplace. A single international application, with a single set of fees, can be filed
in English in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. An international registration can be
obtained without retaining a foreign agent or filing a separate application in each country.
Renewal and assignment of the international registration may each be accomplished by
filing a single request with a single fee.
2. Implementing Legislation
In February 2000, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported the Madrid
Protocol Implementation Act20 to the full Senate. The U.S. House passed an identical bill2'
on April 14, 1999 without opposition. Passage of the implementing legislation would have
no legal effect until the United States accedes to the treaty. However, advocates of the
Madrid Protocol believe that passage of the Implementation Act would provide a certain
impetus toward ratification.
17. This discussion of the Madrid Protocol borrows heavily from an authoritative two-part series authored
by John L. Welch, of Foley, Hoag & Eliot LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, with the permission of that author.
See John L. Welch, Madrid Bound: The United States Approaches Ratification of the Madrid Protocol, PT. 2 INTELL.
PROP. TODAY, 30 Jan. 2001.
18. Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Trademarks,
June 28, 1989, WIPO Pub. No. 204(E), availahle at http://www.wipo.org/eng/iplex/index.htm [hereinafter
Madrid Protocol].
19. Press Release, White House (May 31, 2000).
20. S. 671, 106th Cong. (1999).
21. H.R. 769, 106th Cong. (1999).
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3. The Madrid Agreement
U.S. accession to the Madrid Protocol will come more than one hundred years after the
Madrid Agreement"2 created the first international registration scheme. In 1891, thatAgree-
ment established an international registration system, now administered by WIPO. As of
May 2000, there were fifty-two parties to the Agreement. The United States and other
major countries are not parties to the Madrid Agreement for the following reasons. First,
an international application under the Madrid Agreement may be filed only after registra-
tion (as opposed to an application for registration) of the mark in the home country. Second,
the protection afforded by the International Registration remains dependent on the validity
of the "basic" or "home" registration, and if the basic registration is terminated for any
reason within five years of its issuance (referred to as a "central attack"), all registrations
based on it are invalidated. Third, the allowance of only twelve months during which a
national office may notify WIPO of the unacceptability of the mark is considered unwork-
able in a country like the United States, where the examination process often requires
considerably more time. Fourth, the international application must be filed in French, and
the fees designated by the Agreement are less than corresponding fees in the United States.
4. History of the Madrid Protocol
In an attempt to address these perceived defects and attract more countries to the Madrid
Union, the parties to the Madrid Agreement signed the Madrid Protocol in June 1989.
The Agreement and the Protocol are parallel but independent treaties. The total
membership of the Madrid Union-countries that have signed one or both treaties-is
sixty-six.
The Madrid Protocol took effect in April 1996 and is currently operative in forty-six
countries, including Japan, the United Kingdom (but not the European Community), and
twelve other countries that are not party to the Madrid Agreement.
The principal difference between the Protocol and the Agreement involves the basis for
filing an international application. Under the Madrid Protocol, a home application, not just
a registration, may serve as the filing basis. Thus, the Madrid Protocol provides an interna-
tional application and registration scheme. In addition, the "central attack" problem under
the Madrid Agreement has been mitigated: if a home application or registration fails within
five years of the international registration date, the owner does not lose all related interna-
tional registration rights, but may transform the international registration into national ap-
plications benefiting from the filing date and any priority date of the international registra-
tion. The time limit for a country to refuse registration may be extended to eighteen months,
and longer if an opposition is filed. The international application may be filed in English or
French, and a member nation may charge fees that are equivalent to its national fees.
5. Conforming Changes in U.S. Trademark Law
Although the United States has not yet ratified the Madrid Protocol, it has made a
number of important changes to U.S. trademark law in the past twelve years that bring
U.S. law and practice into conformance with that of many foreign nations. For example,
pursuant to the Lanham Act Amendments of 1988,3 an application may be filed based upon
22. See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 23 U.S.T.
1353, 828 U.N.T.S. 389.
23. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935.
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a bona fide intention to use a mark. The 1988 Amendments also reduced the registration
term from twenty to ten years. In 1999, the Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act
4
eased the minimum requirements for obtaining a filing date and modified the renewal
procedure to comport with international practice by removing the proof-of-use require-
ment from the Section 9 renewal application itself (while adding it to Section 8).
6. Madrid Protocol Implementation Act
The Madrid Protocol Implementation Act would amend the Lanham Act by adding a
new Title XII containing Sections 60 through 74. The Implementation Act is intended to
make procedural, not substantive, changes to U.S. trademark law. Under its terms, the Act
will take effect on the date that the Madrid Protocol enters into force with respect to the
United States.
7. Filing of International Application
The Implementation Act permits the filing of an international application with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office by the owner of a U.S. application or registration, provided
that the owner is a U.S. national or domiciliary or has a real and effective industrial or
commercial establishment in this country. The application may not be filed directly with
WIPO, although the form of the application is prescribed by WIPO. The PTO will ex-
amine the international application to certify that the information corresponds to that of
the basic application or registration, and, if so, will transmit the international application
to the International Bureau of WIPO. The relevant information will then be forwarded by
WIPO to each country designated by the applicant, where the examination and registration
procedures of that country are applied. When the process is completed, the applicant will
own a bundle of foreign rights, all bearing the same international number.
8. Issuance of International Registration
The International Registration is issued by WIPO if all WIPO filing requirements are
met, and the mark is then published in the WIPO Gazette of International Marks. The
International Registration will bear the date on which the international application was
filed with the office of origin, provided the application is received by WIPO within two
months of that filing date; otherwise, it will bear the date of receipt by WIPO. An Inter-
national Registration is effective for a period of ten years and is renewable for further ten-
year periods.
9. Extension of International Registration
The International Registration alone has no legal effect. It is the extension of the Inter-
national Registration to a particular country that has legal force. After WIPO has issued
the International Registration, the requests for extension of protection are forwarded to
the specified countries. A request for extension may be filed concurrently with the inter-
national application or at any time during the life of the International Registration.
24. See Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1988). On May
12, 2000, the U.S. deposited its instrument of ratification of the Trademark Law Treaty, which was adopted
in Geneva, Switzerland, on October 27, 1994. The treaty entered into force with respect to the United States
on August 12, 2000, although the laws implementing the treaty in the United States had already been in effect
since October 30, 1999.
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With respect to an application for International Registration based on a U.S. application
or registration, the PTO is required to notify VVIPO whenever that basic application or
registration has been restricted, abandoned, or cancelled, or when it has expired, with re-
spect to some or all goods or services, either (a) within five years after the international
registration date assigned by WIPO, or (b) more than five years after the international
registration date if the restriction, abandonment, or cancellation resulted from an action
that began before the end of the five-year period. If the International Registration is con-
sequently cancelled, the holder may file corresponding national applications, which may
benefit from the international application date and its applicable priority date.
Under Section 64 of the Implementation Act, the owner of an International Registration
that is based on a U.S. application or registration may seek an extension of protection of
the registration to other countries by filing a request either directly with the International
Bureau of WIPO or by filing with the PTO for transmittal to WIPO.
Under Section 66 of the Implementation Act, an owner of an International Registration
who requests extension of that registration to the United States must include a verified
statement of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce. However, the Implemen-
tation Act does not address the possibility that the owner has already used the mark in the
United States. The request will be examined in the same manner as an application for
registration on the Principal Register. If entitled to an extension of protection, the mark
will be published for opposition in the Official Gazette of the PTO. If an opposition is not
filed, a certificate of extension of protection will issue, giving the owner the same rights as
the owner of a U.S. registration on the Principal Register. An extension of protection
remains in force for the term of the International Registration. However, a Declaration of
Use under Section 8 of the Lanham Act will be required at the sixth anniversary of the
issuance of the certificate of extension, and at each ten-year anniversary of the issue date.
Section 15 incontestability is available. An extension of protection may be assigned, along
with the goodwill appurtenant to the mark, only to a person who is a national of, is dom-
iciled in, or has a bona fide and effective industrial or commercial establishment in, a country
that is a party to the Madrid Protocol.
If a mark would not be eligible for protection on the Principal Register, the request for
extension will be refused. The PTO must send a notification of refusal to WIPO stating
the grounds for refusal. This notification must be sent within eighteen months of WIPO's
transmittal of the request for extension of protection; an additional seven months are al-
lowed for refusal if the PTO notifies WIPO that an opposition may be filed after expiration
of the first eighteen-month period. In responding to a refusal, the holder of the Interna-
tional Registration must designate a domestic representative resident in the United States.
An extension of protection issued by the PTO will be cancelled, in whole or in part, if
the PTO receives notification from WIPO that the corresponding International Registra-
tion has been cancelled as to all or some of the goods or services. If the International
Registration is not renewed, the corresponding extension of protection in the United States
is invalidated.
The holder of an International Registration cancelled in whole or in part may file an
application for registration under Section 1 or 44 of the Lanham Act for the cancelled
goods and services that were covered by the U.S. extension of protection, and may claim a
priority right if the application is filed within three months of the International Registration
cancellation date.
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10. Practical Consequences
As a result of U.S. accession to the Madrid Protocol, it is expected that the number of
references requiring review and investigation as part of the trademark clearance process
will increase significantly. Nevertheless, the potential cost savings offered by the Madrid
Protocol are attractive to the American business community. Under the Protocol, an Amer-
ican applicant for a U.S. trademark registration or an American owner of a U.S. registration
may file a single international application, in English, with the PTO, designating the Pro-
tocol countries in which protection is desired, and paying a single fee. In return, the U.S.
applicant will obtain a bundle of foreign rights under a single International Registration
number, without the expense of hiring foreign lawyers or agents. Renewal and recordal of
an assignment of the International Registration may each be effected in a single filing.
11. Countervailing Considerations
Notwithstanding, there are countervailing considerations that U.S. trademark owners
must consider before filing an application under the Madrid Protocol. The principal draw-
back for American applicants will relate to the scope of goods or services covered by the
application. The scope of coverage of an International Registration under the Protocol is
tied to the scope of the home application/registration for at least the first five years of life
of the International Registration. Because American trademark law requires that the iden-
tification of goods and the recitation of services in a registration be relatively specific, the
scope of the corresponding International Registration will be similarly limited. If the U.S.
application or registration is restricted or terminated during the five-year period following
the International Registration date, or is subsequently restricted or terminated as a result
of an action commenced during that five-year period, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
will notify WVIPO, and the coverage of the International Registration will be correspond-
ingly reduced or terminated. This drawback results from the fundamental principle of
American trademark law that trademark rights are based upon actual use of a mark. Al-
though, as noted above, the United States has amended the Lanham Act in a number of
respects to conform more closely to international practice, the requirement of actual use
remains.
Thus, an American applicant must verify that the mark has been put into use before a
registration will issue, and the goods or services covered by the registration will be limited
specifically to those with which the mark is actually used. A trademark owner cannot, there-
fore, obtain a registration for goods broadly defined as "clothing" or "computer software"
because the PTO will require the applicant to specify the types of clothing and the types
of software. Even a foreign applicant who obtains a registration relying upon Section 44(d)
or 44(e) of the Lanham Act2s without a showing of actual use in this country must verify
that it has a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce; and to avoid cancellation of
the registration after its sixth year, a Declaration Under Section 8 must be filed, verifying
that the mark has been used in this country. Thus, the broad language found in the foreign
application or registration will have to be narrowed in the U.S. application before a reg-
istration will issue.
25. Federal Trademark Act of 1946, as amended (Lanham Act), §§ 44(d), 44(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(d), 15
U.S.C. § 1126(e).
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12. Issue for U.S. Applicants
The basic issue for a U.S. applicant is, when seeking international trademark protection,
whether the applicant should file under the Madrid Protocol in order to save money, or,
alternatively, whether the applicant should file individual, national applications in some or
all of the desired Protocol jurisdictions to maximize the scope of the protection. The answer
will vary from case to case. Companies that launch new products internationally, such as
pharmaceutical companies, have probably conducted extensive clearance searches, and are
not likely to encounter objections in foreign countries. The Protocol will be attractive to
such companies. However, most American companies start with a product in this country
and subsequently take the product abroad. Because a commitment has been made to the
mark, such a company is not likely to conduct further searching, and is therefore more
likely to meet an objection in a foreign application. The savings from a Madrid Protocol
filing may then be lost when a foreign representative must be hired to respond to the
objection.
Moreover, while many companies will not be concerned if the foreign protection is lim-
ited to the scope of the U.S. registration, others, for example, clothing producers, may
desire coverage for a broad line of goods even where the U.S. registration is limited to a
specific item, in order to preserve its option for future expansion of the product line. Com-
panies who own a house mark or a famous mark may well decide to spend the additional
money for national filings in order to obtain broad protection for the mark16
Alternatively, the Madrid Protocol may not be as attractive to companies with relatively
descriptive marks, since descriptive marks are rejected in some jurisdictions unless second-
ary meaning is shown. One commentator has observed that, except for companies who have
already searched and confirmed the registrability of their marks, filing under the Protocol
26. See John L. Welch, supra note 16. In his article noted above, Welch notes one "rather curious way" in
which a U.S. company could obtain a relatively broad foreign protection under the Protocol but narrow
protection in this country: An intent-to-use application might be filed in this country, along with a correspond-
ing application for International Registration, identifying a "laundry list" of goods (or services) that includes
many individual elements: for example, shoes, shirts, socks, shorts, hip-huggers, and so forth. If the U.S.
application survives examination and the opposition period, a Notice of Allowance will issue; the applicant may
extend the time for filing the Statement of Use for up to three years. Meanwhile, the requests for extension of
the International Registration in the various designated Protocol countries will have been examined, and the
extensions of protection likely granted. In fact, each country or organization (i.e., Benelux) must examine the
request for extension before the expiration of, at most, eighteen months from the International Registration
date. In this country, however, the applicant may file its Statement of Use at the very end of the three-year
post-allowance period. It is not uncommon for a period of more than two years to pass between the filing of
an application and the issuance of the Notice of Allowance, and so the Statement of Use may ultimately be
filed after the fifth anniversary of the International Registration. Under the Protocol, the International Reg-
istration is then no longer tied to the U.S. basic application. Even if this hypothetical applicant deletes some
of the goods at the time of filing the Statement of Use-indeed, with regard to "laundry list" applications,
many of the goods are commonly deleted when the Statement of Use is filed-the International Registration
retains the original broad list of goods. The same would be true if the U.S. applicant simply abandoned the
application at the end of the last extension period, or if the PTO found, when the specimens of use were finally
submitted, that the mark was highly descriptive or generic, and unregistrable. The interaction of the five-year
dependency rule under the Protocol, and the potential delay of more than five years for completion of pros-
ecution of an application in the United States-whether resulting from a successful appeal from a refusal to
register, a successful defense of an opposition, or the scenarios mentioned above-may yield consequences that
are "unique for American trademark owners."
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is a roll of the dice-with luck, a company will not have to hire local representation and
will save money on its foreign filing program.2 7
13. Limitations on Assignability
Another significant drawback of the Madrid Protocol concerns the limitation it imposes
on recordation of an assignment of an International Registration and, more importantly,
the impact of national laws on the legality of such an assignment." Under the Madrid
Protocol, the assignment of an International Registration may be recorded in a single filing
with a single fee. It is also possible to record an assignment of the Registration as to some
of the contracting jurisdictions, or as to some of the goods and services. However, in every
case, the new holder must be a person who would be entitled to file an international ap-
plication under Article 2(1), that is, a person who is a national or a domiciliary of, or has a
real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in, a contracting state. While this
limitation affects only recordation of an assignment, rather than the legality or validity of
an assignment, it is a significant limitation for a purchaser who wants to be able to record
an assignment of the rights purchased. The inability of a potential purchaser of trademark
rights to record the assignment may have a significant impact on whether and in what form
a business deal is completed.
As to the legality of an assignment of an extension of protection in a particular country,
and the impact of the refusal by WIPO to record the assignment, national law governs.
The Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, as now being considered by Congress, states
that an extension of protection to the United States may be assigned only to a person who
meets the Article 2(1) eligibility requirements. Just as a foreign applicant for extension of
protection in this country should consider the impact of this provision of U.S. law, an
American applicant or registrant contemplating a Madrid Protocol filing would be wise to
consider the national laws regarding the assignability of extensions of protection in the
contemplated jurisdictions.
14. Designating Protocol Countries
Yet another consideration in contemplating a Protocol filing is the determination of that
country to include in the international application. In countries whose representatives
charge relatively low fees, direct filing of a national application may be preferable, in order
to secure the broadest protection at a reasonable cost. In a country with relatively high
agent fees, like the United Kingdom and Japan, an international applicant may choose to
designate that country under the Protocol even though the ultimate scope of coverage may
be restricted to that obtained in the basic U.S. registration.
15. Implications for Trademark Practitioners
It is believed that American trademark practitioners will initially be bypassed by foreign
applicants who designate the United States for an extension of protection of the Interna-
27. See Carlo Cotrone, The United States and the Madrid Protocol: A Time to Decline, a Time to Accede, 4 MARQ.
INTELL. PROp. L. REv. 75 (2000). Moreover, Cotrone contends that, because of the many grounds for cancel-
lation available in this country, the potential here for a successful "central attack" on the home registration-
forcing the American registrant to transform the International Registration into costly national filings-may
dissuade the American mark owner from filing under the Protocol.
28. See Welch, supra note 16.
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tional Registration. The request for extension will be transmitted by the International Bu-
reau of WIPO directly to the receiving office (the PTO), without the need for a local
representative.
Under the Protocol, if the receiving office refuses to grant the requested extension of
protection, the office may require that any response be filed through a representative located
within its territory. However, the U.S. implementation legislation does not require the
applicant to respond to a refusal through a local representative, although it provides that,
at the time of responding to a notification of refusal, the holder of the International Reg-
istration must designate a domestic representative on who may be served notices or process
in proceedings affecting the mark.
It is anticipated that American trademark practitioners can expect some loss of revenue
from direct U.S. filings during the first few months after implementation of the Protocol.
However, since most U.S. applications are refused registration on the first examination,
American practitioners will probably recover much of this lost revenue at the examination
stage. Thus, if the total number of U.S. filings from the Protocol jurisdictions increases,
American practitioners may see a surge in revenues, albeit delayed in time, when these
increased filings result in more refusals to register, more appeals, and more inter partes
proceedings.
Foreign practitioners, in turn, can expect to see a permanent drop in revenue resulting
from the loss of national filings on behalf of American applicants. Foreign requests for
extension in many countries may be expected to encounter considerably less difficulty than
requests filed in this country. Some foreign countries conduct little or no examination of a
trademark application, and so practitioners in those countries will be least likely to recoup
their lost revenues.
16. Impact on PTO
The PTO does not expect a flood of additional "applications," that is, requests for ex-
tension-as a result of this country's accession to the Madrid Protocol29 If this were a
concern, the United States could reduce the number of requests for extension by invoking
Section 14(5) of the Protocol, which allows an acceding country to declare that preexisting
International Registrations may not be extended to it. Three countries-Estonia, Hungary,
and Turkey-have invoked that provision.
HI. Decisions by International Tribunals
A. WTO RULING AGAINST U.S.
On May 5, 2000, a dispute panel of the World Trade Organization held that the United
States violated rules on intellectual property protection by adopting music licensing legis-
lation that liberalized the infringement exemption for small bars, restaurants, and shops
that play broadcast music without paying royalties or getting the right holder's permission.3 0
Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act,3 as amended by the 1998 Fairness in Music Licensing
Act,32 violates Article 9.1 of the WNTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
29. See id.
30. See International Developments, 22(9) ETrM'T L. REP. (2001).
31. United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2001).
32. Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2830 (1998).
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Rights33 (TRIPS), the panel held. The decision was a victory for the Irish Music Rights
Organization (IMRO).
The European Commission had estimated that losses to artists throughout the EU from
the 1998 U.S. legislation were around Euro 28 million ($25 million) annually.
The panel held that Section 110(5)(b) of the U.S. Copyright Act is inconsistent with
Article 11 of the 1971 Berne Convention, 4 which grants authors exclusive rights over public
communication of their works. Article 9.1 of TRIPS incorporates articles 1-21 of the Berne
Convention into the WTO Agreement.
However, the panel ruled in favor of the United States on the so-called home style
provision under Section 110(5)(a), holding the provision is compatible with Berne and
TRIPS. That provision states that public performance of a musical work is not an infringe-
ment of copyright provided that it is "on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly
used in private homes"15 and that the music is not retransmitted or that a fee is charged to
hear it. The United States had never refuted the claim that the Fairness in Music Licensing
Act was a prima facie violation of the Berne Convention, but it argued that the licensing
exemptions were permissible under Article 13 of TRIPS, which allows limitations and ex-
ceptions from TRIPS' copyright rules for "certain special cases which do not conflict with
a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the right holder" (the "de minimis" exemption).36
B. OTHER RULINGS
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled against the Netherlands' challenge to
the EU's Biotechnology Directive.37 The Netherlands had sought a preliminary injunction
against implementation of the directive on the grounds that it creates substantive law by
providing for the patentability of bio-engineered plants and animals, for which a directive
is not the proper vehicle. However, the ECJ rejected the Netherlands' argument that the
European Commission should have used a regulation, which the Netherlands could have
blocked with a veto.
The European Patent Office issued a decision on the patentability of information on
"carriers" (e.g., a DVD), and whether the combination of the information plus the carriers
33. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 81; implemented in the U.S. by the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4976-81 (1994).
34. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886 (completed
at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1909, completed at Berne on March 20, 1914, revised
at Rome on June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels on June 26, 1948, and revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967)
(with Protocol regarding developing countries), 102 Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://
www.wipo.org/eng/iplex/index.htm [hereinafter Berne Convention].
35. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
36. Although the United States could have appealed the adverse portion of the panel report to a WTO
appellate body, the United States instead informed the WTO that it would implement the panel's recommen-
dations but required a "reasonable period of time" as permitted by WTO procedural rules. If the United States
does not repeal the Fairness in Music Licensing Act byJuly 27, 2001, then the European Communities, under
WTO rules, may demand compensation from the United States and even suspend their obligations to the
United States under the WTO agreement.
37. See Royal Society of Chemistry, EU Overrides Dutch Resistance to EU Directive on Biotecbnology, CHEM.
Bus. NEWsBA E, June 26, 2001. The Dutch, who are supported by the Italians, consider the patenting of living
material to be unethical.
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is patentable." The patent application was initially refused because the Examining Division
deemed the coded information on the carrier as being a "presentation of information as
such" and therefore unpatentable under EPO practice. However, the Board of Appeal over-
turned the Examining Division on the grounds that the information on the carrier was
representative of the technical content underlying the invention. The decision is significant
because the Board interpreted the arrangement of coded picture lines to be true technical
content. The Board found that the data arrangement defined the technically operative data
coding and not merely the illustrative data content stored within the coding. The Board
referred to these data types as the "functional data" and the "cognitive information content."
The Board also concluded that the words "for use" in the carrier claim implied that the
operative data coding also had to be suitable for use in the picture retrieval system. There-
fore, although the data was only defined in loose functional terms in the claim, it was
incorrect to conclude that the protected carrier data could be of any type whatsoever, as
the Examining Division had concluded.
IV. ICANN
On November 16, 2000, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) announced the selection of seven new generic top level domains (gTLDs, or
simply TLDs) to join the familiar "group of five" (".com," ".org," ".net," ".edu," and
".gov"). This development was the first expansion of gTLDs-to be distinguished from
"country code" TLDs (ccTLDs) such as ".uk," ".ru," ".cc," and ".tv"-since the late 1980s.
Beginning in 2001, it became possible for trademark owners to register their names and








.pro Accountants, lawyers, and physicians
1. Protection of Trademark Rights in the New gTLDs
In May 2001, ICANN executed agreements with the registries for ".biz" and ".info,"
respectively. Each registry announced procedures to protect trademark rights and minimize
the incidence of "cybersquatting." However, neither was equipped to deal with the vexatious
problems raised by competing claims of priority among applicants for the identical domain
name.
The ".biz" registry announced an "IP Claim" service allowing trademark owners an
opportunity (for a fee) to identify their marks to the registry before the actual domain name
registration process begins. In the event that another party attempts to register the same
name as the trademark covered in the IP Claim, the would-be domain name registrant is
notified of the pre-existing IP Claim before he is allowed to proceed through the application
38. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 3.
VOL. 35, NO. 2
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES 481
process. The trademark owner is then notified and given the opportunity to oppose the
domain name registration.
It remains to be seen how the ".biz" registrar will resolve competing applications for
domain name registrations based on identical trademarks for disparate goods and services,
all of which can co-exist on the Principal Register of the U.S. Trademark Office, and in
the global marketplace for goods and services, but not in a single Internet domain.
A procedurally different but equally problematic effort to protect "trademark owners"
was announced by the registry for the "info" top level domain, in the form of a thirty-day
"sunrise" period during which trademark owners are provided an opportunity to register
their trademarks as domain names under that TLD, following which registration is available
to the general public. The possibility that a member of the "general public" may have a
trademark right that is prior in time or otherwise more legitimate than that of the supposed
"trademark owner(s)," apparently is not contemplated. According to reports, one or both
registries intend to treat competing applications equally, that is to say, randomly, provided
they are based on existing trademark registrations.
The resolution of competing claims randomly may seem a peculiar way to operate where
certified information about trademark registration and ownership was solicited in the first
place. And yet registrars are caught between the need to fairly administer the registration
process and the need to avoid becoming embroiled in controversies between competing
claimants.
Increasing numbers of trademark owners, faced with the prospect of such "random se-
lection," are opting out of the process in the expectation that increasing numbers of top
level domains will become available with a corresponding loss of premium associated with
a particular domain. While the ".com" TLD will retain its cachet, the propensity of each
new TLD to cause a virtual stampede will diminish rapidly.
In the meantime, measures such as the "IP Claim" service and the "sunrise" period share
an essential defect: while they introduce a cost into the Domain Name System, neither is
capable of resolving conflicts among domain name applicants with colorable rights to use
a particular name. Each of the measures is intended to function as a bulwark against an
anticipated "land rush" of domain name applications, but neither accounts for the principal
distinction between cyberspace and real estate, to wit: the supply of addresses in cyberspace,
unlike that of their counterparts in the "real" world, is unlimited. Each time a new top level
domain becomes available, the quantity of available domain names increases by a number
approaching the entirety of words and phrases in a particular language.
Considering the absence of technical obstacles to the proliferation of TLDs, the spectacle
of ICANN's efforts to regulate this process through the painstaking introduction of seven
TLDSs brings to mind the image of a boy with his finger in a massive dike.39
39. In fact, the number of top level domains has proliferated, although none except the seven identified
above are authorized by ICANN and therefore do not appear on the authoritative root (the "A Root") recognized
by the Domain Name System (DNS) and maintained on hardware located at some thirteen central locations.
As of this writing, as many as five hundred unauthorized top level domains are in operation. They are "unau-
thorized" in the sense that search engines on store-bought computers will not reach them, but neither are they
prohibited, inasmuch as computer owners are free to download software that will cause their computers to re-
route addresses to the maverick domains. An Internet service provider such as Earthlink may, and did, contract
with an Internet domain name registrar named New.Net, offering its ISP customers a user-friendly, "single-
click" opportunity to access the "unauthorized" domains.
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As the supply of available Internet domain names approaches infinity, one can expect a
downward pressure on the price of domain names with a tendency to approach zero. The
prospect of that development leads one to inquire whether the interests of trademark owners
are genuinely threatened by the expansion in top level domains, or whether instead the
artificial scarcity of domain names is best suited to cybersquatters and others who speculate
in the market for secondary "generic" domain names. One thing seems apparent: as long
as there is a real or perceived scarcity in available top level domains, there will be an
institutional incentive for cybersquatting, and an attendant need for inexpensive and effec-
tive procedures against persons who register and use domain names in bad faith.
2. The UDRP
If a domain name registrant refuses in bad faith to assign his name to the owner of a valid
trademark covering the same name, then the trademark owner may obtain the cancellation
or assignment of the infringing domain name by way of an arbitration-like procedure under
the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).4° The UDRP is available to all trademark
owners, registered or otherwise.
The UDRP is incorporated in the service contracts between Internet domain name own-
ers and their domain name registrars pursuant to the registrar's agreement with ICANN.
There are a number of authorized arbitration tribunals including but not limited to the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).41 Filing fees vary among these tribunals.
The current filing fee at WIPO is $1,500 for a single arbitrator.4
To be successful in a UDRP arbitration, the complainant must show that:
(i) the respondent's domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or
service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect to the domain name;
and
(iii) the respondent's domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
For international and intellectual property practitioners, it is vital to distinguish between
the elements of proof in a UDRP proceeding and those in a case of trademark infringement.
Unlike trademark infringement, where the infringer's subjective intent may be relevant but
not dispositive, bad faith is a mandatory showing in a UDRP proceeding. If a domain name
registrant did not know that he was infringing the rights of a trademark owner when he
registered his domain name, then he was not acting in "bad faith" within the meaning of
the UDRP
The UDRP identifies the following four examples of bad faith: 41
40. See http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm. Although the UDRP is referred to as "arbi-
tration," it does not constitute "arbitration" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ I
etseq. See Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., No. CIV. A. 00-1823-A (E.D. Va., May 10, 2001) (unpublished) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in declaratory judgment action by dispossessed Internet
domain name registrant following UDRP proceeding brought successfully by declaratory judgment defendant,
holding that FAA's restrictions on judicial review of arbitration awards do not apply to civil actions challenging
UDRP panel decisions).
41. See http://arbiter.wipo.int.
42. See http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/fees/index.html. The fee at WIPO is $3,000 if three panelists are
requested instead of one. The filing fees at WIPO are slightly higher than those of some other tribunals, for
example, the National Arbitration Forum; see http://www.arb-forum.com.
43. These examples are not exhaustive and other evidence may support a finding of bad faith.
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(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or has acquired the
domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring
the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trade-
mark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consid-
eration in excess of his documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain
name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the
trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name,
provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of dis-
rupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for
commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent's website or other on-line location,
by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the respondent's website or location or
of a product or service on the respondent's website or location.
3. ICANN and Country Code Top Level Domains
The World Intellectual Property Organization-pressured by the European Union, the
United States, and Canada-is planning to set up a system of arbitration to administer the
resolution of disputes over names used in country-code top level domains, according to
reports. 4 However, it is unlikely that ICANN, or any other constituency, will challenge the
right of a country, such as the Federation of Tuvalu, to market domain names in its own
country code (".tv" in the case of Tuvalu, or, by way of example, ".tin" for Turkmenistan).
The market for country code TLDs has been a classic study in laissez faire economics, an
ironic contrast to the scrupulous procedure at ICANN regarding the new generic TLDs.
In any event, the need for cooperation between the European Union and ICANN has
apparently eclipsed their dispute over the ".eu" country code domain.
45
While extension of the UDRP-like procedure for such a procedure would be universally
commended, it raises questions about ICANN's international jurisdiction that are even
thornier than those involving its jurisdiction in the United States.
V. U.S. Court Decisions
Recent U.S. court decisions are noted below to the extent they involve issues involving
jurisdiction in cyberspace and/or conflicting claims to Internet domain names in generic
top level domains such as ".com."
44. E.g., Bower, "Squatters Heaven," THE PRAGuE POST, May 16, 2001 (discussing cybersquatting in the
"cz." ccTLD).
45. Throughout calendar year 2000, the European Union demanded its own country-code top-level domain,
arguing that it qualified for a country code under the International Organization Standard's ISO 3166 inter-
national standard for geographic bodies. ICANN balked, citing concerns over possible effects on international
electronic commerce arising from a new country-code domain for the European Union. ICANN representa-
tives would say only that the question was "politically sensitive," and some observers claimed that ICANN's
primary concern was the fact of its own jurisdiction. The position argued by EU policy makers was consistent
with their stance in negotiations involving the recent U.S. accession to the Madrid Protocol. ICANN's reluc-
tance to freely grant the requested domain, in contrast, may seem less consistent with its own precedent,
considering that the Cocos (Keeling) Islands have their own top level domain (".cc"), even though they are a
constituent entity in the Federation of Tuvalu, which has its own top level domain (".tv").
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A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
There is currently a substantial degree of debate and confusion over the issue of when
"minimum contacts" are established in the case of a website operator who transacts business
over the Internet with a purchaser who later seeks to hale the website operator into court
in the purchaser's jurisdiction." A number of recently reported opinions have upheld ju-
risdiction, 41 or declined jurisdiction, 4s or both,49 under particular facts.
The majority of courts to address the issue have examined "the nature and quality of
activity that a defendant conducts over the Internet," and have applied the analytical "sliding
46. See, e.g., Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 259 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting "current debate as to which
fora have jurisdiction over a defendant who seeks to use its website for the solicitation of or transaction of
business").
47. See, e.g., Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying
motion to dismiss where defendant sold equipment to New York customers); Euromarket Designs, Inc. v.
Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. 11. 2000) (denying motion to dismiss by Irish retailer who
operated interactive website that allowed Illinois residents to order goods from Illinois for shipment to foreign
address); McCrae's, Inc. v. Hussain, 105 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (denying motion to dismiss where
defendant domain name registrant did not merely operate infringing website, interactive or otherwise, but
allegedly intended to register domain names in bad faith); Bancroft & Masters Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223
F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (trademark owner's letter of protest to Virginia domain name registrar about Cali-
fornia domain name registrant established specific personal jurisdiction); cf BroadBridge Media LLC v.
Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting jurisdictional challenge to in rem proceeding
under Anticybersquatting Act).
48. See Telebyte Inc. v. Kendaco Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing dispute pursuant
to N.Y. Civ. Pro. Rule 302(a)(2), which allows New York courts to exercise jurisdiction if party commits tortious
act within state, rejecting plaintiff's contention that Section 302(a)(2) can be invoked merely because defendant
offers products for sale to New York residents via defendant's website; also declining to exercise jurisdiction
under Section 302(a)(3), which allows personal jurisdiction if party regularly does or solicits business in state,
where defendant's website provides Washington State telephone numbers and company does not derive sub-
stantial income from New York); Amberson Holdings L.L.C. v. Westside Story Newspaper, 110 F. Supp. 2d
332 (D.NJ. 2000) (holding that defendant's use of New Jersey Web server for operation of website did not
establish sufficient minimum contacts, where access to website reflected nothing more than telephone call by
district resident to defendant's computer servers and only possible connection to forum was host server that
channeled flow of information); Stewart v. Vista Point Verlag, 2000 WL 1459839 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (German
publisher did not subject itself to jurisdiction in New York State by publishing guidebook to New York City,
accepting order for book from plaintiff, or maintaining advertising website accessible to New York residents);
cf Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Va. 2000) (dismissing action for lack of
in rem jurisdiction); America Online Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Va. 2000) (Internet domain
name registration agreements between defendant and domain name registrar located in Virginia are not suf-
ficient contacts with Virginia for exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant); accord, Heath-
mount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va. 2000).
49. See American Eyewear, Inc. v. Peeper's Sunglasses and Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 895 (N.D.
Tex. 2000) (granting motion of defendant New York parent but denying motion of parent's Minnesota sub-
sidiary to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, where Minnesota defendant maintained interactive website
allowing users to exchange information and communicate with defendant, and purposely availed itself of forum
by directing business at Texas residents and making sales to residents of Texas, notwithstanding that neither
defendant (1) has offices, sales agents, or other representatives in Texas; (2) has a registered agent, owns or
leases real or personal property, or has bank accounts or telephone listings in Texas; (3) has marketed its
products in, directly advertised in, or sent sales representatives to Texas; or (4) is licensed to do business or
has paid taxes in Texas; and Minnesota defendant made no sales to Texas customers although New York parent
sold approximately twenty-four orders for computer glasses bearing unrelated trademark to Texas residents
representing fewer than 1 percent of New York defendant's total sales).
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scale" formulated in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.5° The district court in
Zippo described a continuum of three principal types of Internet jurisdiction cases. At one
end of the continuum lie businesses or persons who clearly conduct business over the In-
ternet and have repeated contacts with the forum state such that the exercise of inpersonam
jurisdiction is proper. Thus, for example, "if the defendant enters into contracts with res-
idents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of com-
puter files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper.""
At the other end of the continuum are defendants who have done nothing more than
post information or advertising on a website that is accessible to users in the forum juris-
diction. In this regard, "[a] passive Web site that does little more than make information
available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal juris-
diction." 2
The middle ground between the two poles "is occupied by interactive Web sites where
a user can exchange information with the host computer," and, there, "the exercise of
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature
of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site."" Simply put, as the level of
interactivity of the website and the commercial nature of the exchange of information
increase, the more reasonable it is to conclude that a defendant directed its activities pur-
posefully at the forum state and should reasonably have foreseen being haled into court in
the forum jurisdiction.
B. INTERNET DOMAIN NAMsES
If the explosive growth of the Internet dominated the public debate regarding interna-
tional patent and copyright law in calendar 2000, then trademark law was no exception.
U.S. courts were confronted with an avalanche of cases involving conflicting claims to
Internet domain names, including so-called generic Internet domain names, which in prin-
ciple cannot receive any trademark protection at all.
1. "Generic" Internet Domain Names
Theoretically, a "generic" domain name cannot exist, not even "widgets.com." This is
because, under established trademark law, a name or mark can only be generic in connection
with a particular product or service, based on evidence concerning the understanding of
the relevant class of purchaser.54 Thus, "apple.com" may be generic when used by a fruit
distributor, but not by a computer manufacturer. Nonetheless, generic domain names do
exist, judging from the booming secondary market for "generic" domain names. The best
definition of a "generic" domain name is, therefore, a domain name that is not identical or
confusingly similar to any known trademark-a nebulous standard invested with a signifi-
50. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see also Bochan v.
Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 701 (E.D. Va. 1999); see also Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP,
33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 916 (D. Ore. 1999) (citing authorities).
51. ZippoMfg, Inc., 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
52. Id.; see also Mink v. AAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cit. 1999) (denying jurisdiction where
defendant maintained only a passive website). But see Martiz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D.
Mo. 1996) (finding jurisdiction where defendants "consciously decided to transmit advertising information to
all Internet users, knowing that such information will be transmitted globally").
53. See Zippo Mfg., Inc., 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
54. See Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 640 (Fed. Cit. 1991).
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cant degree of risk to the purveyor. Examples of such domains are "bank.com," "busi-
ness.com," and "america.com."
Prices for "generic" domain names on the secondary market averaged between $25,000
and $30,000 in 2000. One dealer, HitDomains.com, was brokering Internet domain names
for an average price of $600,000. That company gained worldwide recognition in the fi-
nancial and business sector when it established a new record for an online Internet sales
price in brokering the sale of "WallStreet.com" for more than $1 million in partnership
with New Commerce Communications. HitDomains.com also sold "Autos.com" for $2.2
million. Meanwhile, the name "AsSeenOnTV.com" was sold for $5 million. As of June 6,
2000, "ForSaleByOwner.com" was selling for $835,000 and "Savings.com" had an asking
price of $1,900,000. "Taxes.com" was going for $700,000 and "Deposits.com" for
$1,500,000. On the same day, the owner of "America.com" was asking $30 million although
the highest bid was a mere $10 million.
2. Recent Domain Name Cases
The rate of Internet domain name disputes to reach the courts increased dramatically in
calendar year 2000 as illustrated by the following chronology of cases reported since the
first of the year:
" January 18, 2000: The Network Network v. CBS Inc., 54 USPQ2d 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(holding that plaintiff has no remedy against defendant's use of similar domain name
under Federal Dilution Act where plaintiffs mark was not famous at time of Defen-
dant's first use)
" January 31, 2000: First Jewelleiy Co. of Canada, Inc. v. Internet Shopping Network LLC,
53 USPQ2d 1838 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting preliminary injunction to holder of
"FIRST JEWELLERY" mark against user of domain name "firstjewelry.com")
" February 2, 2000: Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 E3d 489; 53
USPQ2d 1570 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, No. 99-1852 (2000) (holding that plaintiff's
"Sporty's" mark is famous and entitled to priority over subsequently registered
"sportys.com")
* February 24, 2000: Volkswagen AG v. Virtual Works Inc., 106 E Supp. 2d 845, 54
USPQ2d 1126 (E.D. Va. 2000) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff, holding that
famous automobile manufacturer is exclusive rightful owner of "vw.net" Internet do-
main name notwithstanding prior registration of "vw.net" by Virtual Works Inc.)
* February 28, 2000: OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 E Supp. 2d 176, 54
USPQ2d 1383 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting preliminary injunction against defendants'
use of "thebuffalonews.com" for public comment and criticism of plaintiff's newspaper,
holding that parody defense is available only in absence of confusion)
" March 3, 2000: Caesars World Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F Supp. 2d 505, 54
USPQ2d 1121 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that due process was not violated by "in rem"
action by trademark owners against domain names rather than their owners)
" March 22, 2000: Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 54 USPQ2d 1166 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (granting preliminary injunction to plaintiff where defendant registered five var-
iations of plaintiffs Internet domain name and used them for advertising; after plaintiff
filed suit, defendant changed its sites to "political protest" pages in ploy to cloak itself
in First Amendment protection; held, plaintiff was entitled to protection as owner of
"distinctive" or "famous" mark under Federal Dilution Act)
" March 29, 2000: Cello Holdings, LLC v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F Supp. 2d 464, 54
USPQ2d 1645 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
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personal jurisdiction, where defendant sold equipment to New York customers; denying
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, where issues of fact precluded finding that
plaintiff's "Cello" mark for high end stereo equipment was "famous and distinctive";
holding that Anticybersquatting Act protects "distinctive" and "famous" marks from
identical or confusingly similar domain names, but only protects "famous" marks from
dilutive domain names)
" March 31, 2000: Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 97 E Supp. 2d
96 (D. Mass. 2000) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss, holding allegation that
defendant's use of "northernlights.com" website infringed Northern Light Technol-
ogy's similar sounding Internet search engine and was in bad faith violation states claim
under Anticybersquatting Act)
" April 18, 2000: BigStar Entertainment, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 E Supp. 2d 185,
54 USPQ2d 1685 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)(denying motion of plaintiff video seller, owner of
domain name "bigstar.com," for preliminary injunction against use of "nextbigstar.
com," declining to find "initial interest confusion" in action against non-competitor
defendant talent search company, where domain names were not virtually identical,
plaintiff s marks were weak and lacked secondary meaning, similar names and marks
were in use by third parties, and defendant did not use plaintiffs marks in metatags)
" April 19, 2000: Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000)
(granting preliminary injunction under Anticybersquatting Act, rejecting registrant's
argument that domain names were selected with intent to set up parody sites)
" April 21, 2000: Network Solutions Inc. v. Umbro International Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 259
Va. 759, 54 USPQ2d 1738 (Va. 2000) (holding that Internet domain name registered
to judgment debtor is not a "liability" subject to garnishment under Virginia's creditors'
remedies law, since registrant's contractual right to use unique domain names for spec-
ified period of time is inextricably bound to domain name services provided by registrar
and thus does not exist separate and apart from registrar's services, and domain name
registration thus is product of contract for services)
" May 3, 2000: Lucent Technologies Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 E Supp. 2d 528, 54 USPQ2d
1653 (E.D. Va. 2000) (dismissing action for lack of jurisdiction, holding that plaintiff
gave defendant inadequate notice of action and therefore failed to satisfy jurisdiction
requirements for in rem action against domain name under Anticybersquatting Act;
trademark owner contemplating in rem action against Internet domain name must wait
more than eight days between sending notice and filing action)
• May 16, 2000: Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate &BarrellLtd., 96 E Supp. 2d 824 (N.D.
I1. 2000) (denying motion to stay and motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, where defendant Irish retailer operated interactive website allowing Illinois
residents to order goods from Illinois for shipment to foreign address; holding that
defendant could be sued in Illinois by Illinois plaintiff for violation of Lanham Act; stay
of proceedings would not provide full justice to litigants, parallel litigation in Ireland
would not be adequate vehicle for complete and prompt resolution of Lanham Act and
related state claims)
o May 16, 2000: American Eyewear, Inc. v. Peeper's Sunglasses and Accessories, Inc., 106
E Supp. 2d 895 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (granting motion of defendant New York parent but
denying motion of parent's Minnesota subsidiary to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction, where Minnesota defendant maintained interactive website allowing users to
exchange information and communicate with defendant, and purposely availed itself of
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forum by directing business at Texas residents and making sales to residents of Texas,
notwithstanding that neither defendant (1) has offices, sales agents, or other represen-
tatives in Texas; (2) has a registered agent, owns or leases real or personal property, or
has bank accounts or telephone listings in Texas; (3) has marketed its products in,
directly advertised in, or sent sales representatives to Texas; or (4) is licensed to do
business or has paid taxes in Texas; and Minnesota defendant made no sales to Texas
customers although New York parent sold approximately twenty-four orders for com-
puter glasses bearing unrelated trademark to Texas residents representing fewer than
1 percent of New York defendant's total sales)
May 18, 2000: Porsche Cars North America Inc. v. Spencer, 55 USPQ2d 1026 (E.D. Cal.
2000) (holding that "porschesource.com" violated Anticybersquatting Act and granting
preliminary injunction where domain name would dilute famous mark and where owner
had registered and was trafficking in name with bad faith intent to profit)
June 9, 2000: Porsche Cars North America Inc. v. allporsche.com, 215 E3d 1320, 55
USPQ2d 1158 (4th Cir. 2000) (remanding case for consideration of whether Anti-
cybersquatting Act permits in rem civil action against domain name for federal trade-
mark dilution under § 43(c) of Lanham Act, vacating 51 E Supp. 2d 707, 51 USPQ2d
1461 (E.D. Va. 1999))
June 12, 2000: People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 E Supp.
2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000) (granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, requiring
defendant to transfer registration of domain name "peta.org," derived from "People
Eating Tasty Animals"; holding that defendant used mark "in connection" with goods
and services where website contained hyperlinks to commercial operations offering
goods and services; rejecting defendant's "parody" defense where user would not realize
that website was not official site of plaintiff until he used plaintiffs mark to access site)
June 27, 2000: Washington Speakers Bureau Inc. v. Leading Authorities Inc., 217 E3d 843
(4th Cir. 200) (table) (requiring defendant to transfer domain names infringing "Wash-
ington Speakers Bureau" trademark, holding plaintiffs mark has secondary meaning)
June 30, 2000: McCrae's, Inc. v. Hussain, 105 E Supp. 2d 594 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (denying
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Anticybersquatting Act where
defendant domain name registrant did not merely operate infringing website, inter-
active or otherwise, but allegedly intended to register domain names with bad faith to
profit by extorting money from Mississippi trademark owner who was only legitimate
potential buyer of name)
July 7, 2000: BroadBridge Media LLC v. Hypercd.com, 106 E Supp. 2d 505, 55 USPQ2d
1426 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting jurisdictional challenge to in rem proceeding under
Anticybersquatting Act)
July 13, 2000: America Online Inc. v. Huang, 106 F Supp. 2d 848, 55 USPQ2d 1560
(E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that Internet domain name registration agreements between
defendant and domain name registrar located in Virginia are not sufficient contacts
with Virginia for exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant in action
under Anticybersquatting Act, and neither circumstances of agreements' execution nor
relationship of agreements to forum are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction)
July 13, 2000: Mattel Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., 55 USPQ2d 1620 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that defendants' registration and use of Internet domain name "barbiesplaypen.
com" for adult entertainment site, with bad faith intent to profit from plaintiffs "Bar-
bie" trademarks, constitutes cybersquatting and dilution)
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* July 24, 2000: Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 E Supp. 2d 860, 55
USPQ2d 1735 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that registration of domain name with Virginia
registrar is not sufficient minimum contact for personal jurisdiction and thus cannot
defeat in rem jurisdiction under Anticybersquatting Act)
eJuly 24, 2000: Telebyte Inc. v. Kendaco Inc., 105 E Supp. 2d 131, 56 USPQ2d 1150
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing domain name dispute for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to New York Civil Procedure Rule 302(a)(2), which allows New York courts
to exercise jurisdiction if party commits tortious act within state; rejecting plaintiff's
contention that Section 302 (a)(2) can be invoked merely because defendant offers prod-
ucts for sale to New York residents via defendant's website; also declining to exercise
jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(3), which allows personal jurisdiction if party regu-
larly does or solicits business in state, where defendant's website provides Washington
State telephone numbers and company does not derive substantial income from New
York)
" August 15, 2000: Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F Supp. 2d 420, 56
USPQ2d 1048 (E.D. Va. 2000) (dismissing claim under Anticybersquatting Act, hold-
ing that domain name owner's bad faith intent to profit is necessary element of in rem
action; rejecting argument that Congress intended in personam and in rem causes of
action to have separate elements)
• August 18, 2000: Bancroft & Masters Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., 223 E3d 1082, 55
USPQ2d 1941 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that trademark owner's letter of protest to
Virginia domain name registrar about California domain name registrant established
specific personal jurisdiction for California court to hear declaratory judgment claim
of alleging no trademark infringement)
" August 22, 2000: Amberson Holdings LLC v. Westside Story Newspaper, 110 E Supp. 2d
332 (D. NJ. 2000) (granting motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding
that defendant's use of NewJersey Web server for operation of website did not establish
sufficient minimum contacts, where access to website reflected nothing more than tele-
phone call by district resident to defendant's computer servers and only possible con-
nection to forum was host server that channeled flow of information; accord, Stewart v.
Vista Point Verlag, No. 99 Civ. 4225 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y, Sept. 29, 2000) (holding that
German publisher did not subject itself to jurisdiction in New York State by publishing
guidebook to New York City, accepting order for book from plaintiff, or maintaining
advertising website accessible to New York residents)
* August 25, 2000: Paccar Inc. v. Telescan Technologies, L.L.C., 115 E Supp. 2d 772 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (granting plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction against defendant's
use of domain names incorporating plaintiffs trademarks and hyperlinks to associated
websites for information about specific products, notwithstanding disclaimer; rejecting
defendant's contention that use was purely descriptive)
" August 28, 2000: A Touch of Class Jewelry Co. v.I.C. Penny Co., Inc., No. 98-2949 (E.D.
La. 2000) (granting defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of plaintiffs do-
main name registrations in action for willful trademark infringement, where registra-
tion of domain names did not constitute trademark use and was therefore irrelevant)
• September 8, 2000: Banco Inverlat S.A. v. www.Inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D.
Va. 2000) (holding that court has discretion in in rem proceeding to excuse statutory
requirement of notice by publication where plaintiff demonstrated that domain name
registrant had notice of proceeding by traditional mail and e-mail)
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" September 13, 2000: Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Johnson, 56 USPQ2d 1637 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (denying motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff stated claim for relief under
Anticybersquatting Act by alleging that defendant's "lucentsucks.com" was confusingly
similar to plaintiff's mark and that display of pornographic material and attempt to sell
name to plaintiff for $10,0000 evidenced bad faith intent to profit from mark)
" September 19, 2000: Greenpoint Financial Corp. v. The Sperry & Hutchinson Co., Inc., 116
E Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying preliminary injunction where plaintiff failed
to show likelihood of success on claim that defendant's use of "GREENPOINTS" and
domain name "greenpoints.com" constituted infringement or dilution; holding that
presumption of harm was rebutted where plaintiff delayed four months in requesting
injunctive relief, and that plaintiffs mark was geographically descriptive absent proof
of secondary meaning)
" September 25, 2000: Northland Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 115 E Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Minn.
2000) (denying preliminary injunction, holding that registration and use of domain
name containing insurance company's trademark for purpose of criticizing insurance
company was not infringing; rejecting "initial interest confusion" argument where de-
fendant did not trade on value of plaintiffs mark, and website operator lacked bad faith
intent to profit from his registration and use of domain name)
" October 25, 2000: Deleo v. Zconnexx Corp., No. 00-CV-0319E(F) (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (de-
nying preliminary injunction where plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm or like-
lihood of success on claim that defendants conspired to deprive plaintiffs of right to
use generic domain name "yellowpage.net")
" October 30, 2000: Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. 00-4055 (E.D.
Pa. 2000) (awarding costs, attorney fees and $100,000 statutory damages to plaintiff
per infringing domain name where defendant registered confusingly similar misspelled
domain names with bad faith intent to profit from plaintiffs mark)
* November 7, 2000: Hasbro Inc. v. Clue Computing Inc., No. 00-1297 (1st Cir. 2000)
(affirming district court decision that Internet domain name "clue.com" neither in-
fringes nor dilutes trademark rights in "Clue" name for board games, affirming 66
E Supp. 2d 117, 52 USPQ2d 1402 (D. Mass. 1999); district court reasonably refused
to undertake "initial interest confusion" analysis where products and services had no
relationship; "Clue" was not "famous" for board games within meaning of Federal
Dilution Act and clue.com did not blur or tarnish Hasbro's mark; declining to address
disagreement among courts on retroactivity of Dilution Act as immaterial to outcome
of case)
" December 8,2000, Registercom v. Verio Inc., 126 E Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (grant-
ing preliminary injunction, holding that use of software program or "robot" to access
Internet domain registrar's database for contact information of registrants constitutes
trespass to chattels and violated Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030
et seq.)
" December 18, 2000, eCash Technologies Inc. v. Guagliardo d/bia ecash.com, 127 E Supp.
2d 1069, 57 USPQ2d 1605 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that registration of domain name
by itself does not give registrant any rights in trademark that is the same as the domain
name).
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